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Abstract – In this paper, we discuss the lessons learned from a project that combined diﬀerent types of
methods to study the interaction of ecological dynamics, experience of resource users, and institutional
arrangements. We combined theoretical computational models, laboratory experiments with undergrad-
uate students in the USA, field experiments and role gameswith villagers in rural Thailand and Colombia.
The expectation at the start of the project was that specific experience with resource management would
aﬀect the way participants play the game and the rules they would develop. We found that contextual
variables, such as trust in other community members and the feeling of being an accepted member of
the community, and also the ecological context had significant explanatory power, more than experience.
Another conclusion fromusing these diﬀerentmethods is the fact that the quality of resourcemanagement
lies more on the possibility of communication rather than on the types of rules crafted or selected.
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Résumé – Une démarche multiméthode pour l’étude de la gouvernance de systèmes socio-
écologiques. Cet article présente les résultats généraux d’un projet de recherche international visant
à tester une combinaison de diﬀérentes méthodes pour étudier les interactions entre dynamiques éco-
logiques, expérience des usagers des ressources et organisation des institutions. Nous avons combiné
des modèles de simulation informatique, des expérimentations en laboratoire avec des étudiants aux
Étas-Unis, des expérimentations de terrain et des jeux de rôles au sein de communautés rurales en
Colombie et en Thaïlande. L’hypothèse à l’origine du projet était que l’expérience de ceux qui ont parti-
cipé à ces expérimentations aﬀecterait leurs résultats. Nous avons trouvé que des variables contextuelles,
telles la confiance dans les autres membres de la communauté ou le sentiment d’appartenance à la com-
munauté ainsi que le contexte écologique, ont un pouvoir explicatif plus important que l’expérience des
participants. La seconde conclusion que l’on tire du croisement de ces méthodes est le fait que la qualité
de la gestion des ressources dépend plus de la possibilité de communication entre les usagers que du type
de règles qu’ils choisissent ou qu’ils créent.
Introduction
Increasing eﬀorts are devoted to studying social-
ecological systems (SESs) in an eﬀort to understand
principles of eﬀective governance. This endeavor is chal-
lenging due to the complex temporal and spatial dynam-
ics at multiple levels and scales. The complexity of SESs
requires the use of multiple methods to derive diﬀer-
ent types of knowledge, varying from field studies and
Corresponding author: F. Bousquet, bousquet@cirad.fr
experiments to agent-based models and role games. In
Poteete et al. (2010), the use of multiple methods in prac-
tice has been discussed in detail, resulting in a revised
theory of collective action and the commons that includes
three elements: individual decision making, micrositu-
ational conditions, and features of the broader social-
ecological context.
In this paper, we discuss the lessons learned from
one of our projects that combined diﬀerent types of
methods to study the interaction of ecological dynamics,
Article published by EDP Sciences
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experience of resource users, and institutional arrange-
ments. We combined theoretical computational models,
laboratory experiments with undergraduate students in
the USA, field experiments and role games with villagers
in rural Thailand and Colombia. We discuss the method-
ological challenges experienced in combining the diﬀer-
ent methods, as well as resultingmethodological innova-
tions. For example, the practice of field experiments and
role games was adjusted after the investigators, who had
experience with diﬀerent methods, worked together to
undertake both field experiments and role games in the
same villages. Another example is the development of
new laboratory experiments based on observations dur-
ing field experiments. Moreover, we elaborate on how
these methods have led to improved insights into the
theoretical framework proposed by Poteete et al. (2010).
By going back and forth between case studies, experi-
mentation, and formalmodeling, we can address specific
theoretical puzzles inspired by empirical observations
and replicated and disentangled with formal models.
The paper ends with lessons learned and methodologi-
cal challenges ahead to study the fit between institutional
arrangements and ecological dynamics.
Case study: dynamics of rules
An important questionwith regard to collective action
of natural resources is the fit between ecological dynam-
ics and institutional arrangements. How can appropria-
tors craft eﬀective rule structures? A long-term project to
address this problem isusedhere as an example of theuse
of multiple methods. The project, which started in 2004
for a period of six years, was funded by the National
Science Foundation of the USA. The project included
scholars from Arizona State University (USA), Indiana
University (USA),Universidad de los Andes (Colombia),
and Cirad (France).
The original aim of the project was to understand
how resource users craft eﬀective institutional rules, how
these are related to the ecological dynamics and the ex-
pertise of the participants. Such information would be of
use to develop formalmodels of institutional change and
adaptation, for example in the face of climate change.
Since existing experimental work wasmainly focused on
comparing the eﬀects of one institutional arrangement
versus another, not how participants crafted rules, new
experiments needed to have designs in which the rule-
crafting could be observed more closely and that would
generate new data that could be used to develop formal
models.
From the start, the project aimed to include labora-
tory experiments with undergraduate students, field ex-
periments, and role games with villagers in Colombia
and Thailand. These countries were chosen because
of existing contacts with an experimental economist,
Juan-Camilo Cardenas, who had performed many
field experiments in Colombia, and a modeler of
social-ecological systems, François Bousquet, who had
combined role games and agent-based modeling in
Southeast Asia. Other investigators in the project were
faculty from diverse disciplines at Indiana University,
namely cognitive scientist Robert Goldstone, computer
scientist Filippo Menczer, and political scientist Elinor
Ostrom. The principal investigator, Marco Janssen, is
an applied mathematician, who moved to Arizona State
University during the project. All investigators were fa-
miliar with the details of some of the methods, but not
with all.
During the beginning of the project, the investigators
needed to get familiar enough with each other’s method
to start designing experiments. Building upon an exist-
ing experimental environment developed by Goldstone
(Goldstone and Ashpole, 2004), new laboratory experi-
mentsweredeveloped inwhich participants experienced
spatial and temporal dynamics. Inclusionof thosedimen-
sions was important since meta-analysis of field studies
has shown that these are critical to distinguish diﬀerent
types of institutional arrangements (Schlager et al., 1994).
With these laboratory experiments,microsituational vari-
ables could be manipulated and rule-crafting could be
observed, especially when communications could be
recordedbecause participantswere using text-based chat
rooms (Janssen et al., 2008; Janssen andOstrom, 2008). Us-
ing high-resolution experimental data, agent-basedmod-
els could be tested in a rigorous way (Janssen et al., 2009).
The field experiments and role games went through
two years of preparation before the first experiments
could be performed. Due to diﬀerences inmethodologies
used by the various investigators, new problems needed
to be solved if both experiments and role games could
be performed in all six villages in two diﬀerent coun-
tries. Experiments went through a series of tests at the
lab and then in the field. Once the protocol was written
in English, it was translated in Thai and Spanish. It was
then reviewed and approved by the institutional review
board to ensure that human subjects are treated ethically
and that their rights and welfare are adequately pro-
tected. This preparation of experiments and role games
led to innovations for field experiments (Cardenas et al.,
to appear). For the first time, this project combined role
games and field experiments. Having the villagers first
participate in field experiments, and then, later, adjust the
field experiments into role games in line with their local
context, represented innovations in the methodology of
role games.
Some laboratory experiments performed later in the
project were based on experiences derived from the
field experiments. For example, an irrigation game char-
acterized by asymmetry of access to the resource led
participants in field experiments to balance eﬃciency
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Fig. 1. A screen shot of the experimental environment. The star-shaped figures are resource tokens, the circles are avatars of the
participants (lighter color is participant’s own avatar [here it is number 3], darker color represents other participants).
(investment in infrastructure) and equity (allocation of
water). This was translated into a downloading game in
a laboratory experiment with a similar payoﬀ structure,
and similar findings (Janssen et al., to appear). In the labo-
ratory experiments, communication was allowed, which
resulted in higher levels of cooperation and coordina-
tion over the rounds. There was more variability in the
outcomes for the field experiments. The experimental de-
signs that came out of this project would not have been
possible if it had focused on one methodology. Scholars
familiar with diﬀerent methods who were challenging
each other led to innovative designs that other scholars
are now beginning to adopt.
We now discuss in more detail some of the results
from the project before we discuss the implications for
methodology and theory.
Laboratory experiments
The main research question related to performing
laboratory experiments was what kind of rules would
participants choose in diﬀerent types of resource ecolo-
gies. In doing so, we have developed a new experi-
mental environment that includes more relevant eco-
logical dynamics than traditional experiments. Unlike
previous experiments that utilize static, one-shot, or re-
peated interactions to investigate these issues, we inves-
tigate a real-time dynamic resource-harvesting setting.
The software used for this experiment is open-source and
available at http://commons.asu.edu. Participants appro-
priate renewable tokens from a shared renewable re-
source environment (Fig. 1).
In our experiments, groups of four or five share a few
hundred cells. In order to collect a token, a participant
must position their avatar on the location of that token
and explicitly press the space bar. Each token harvested
is worth $0.02 USD. Participants have complete informa-
tion on the spatial position of tokens and can watch the
harvesting actions of other group members in real time.
Empty cells have the potential to generate new tokens
each second. The probability that a given empty cell will
generate a token is density-dependent on the number of
adjacent cells with tokens. The probability pt is linearly
related to the number of neighbors: pt = p ∗ nt/N where
nt is the number of neighboring cells containing a green
token, N (= 8) is the number of neighboring cells, and
p = 0.01 or 0.02. If an empty cell is completely surrounded
by eight tokens, it will generate a token at a higher prob-
ability than an empty cell that abuts only three tokens.
At least one adjacent cell must contain a token for a new
token generation to occur. Therefore, if participants ap-
propriate all of the tokens on the screen, they have ex-
hausted the resource and no additional token generation
will occur. By designing the environment in this man-
ner, we capture a key characteristic of many spatially
dependent renewable resources. The optimum level of
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appropriation depends on the initial starting conditions
and probabilistic renewal of the empty cells. If we ignore
the spatial variability, the optimal strategy is derived by
keeping the resource at a 50% density and all tokens are
harvested during the last second of the experiment.
Before we discuss a series of experiments in more de-
tail, we first discuss the initial sets of experiments. In
Janssen et al. (2008), the eﬀect of an endogenous rule
change from open access to private property is examined
as a potential solution to overharvesting in commons
dilemmas. Five participants share a common resource
and could not communicate. When they got the option
to invest in private property in the second round of the
experiment, half of the participants did. If a majority in a
group invested in the option of private property, this op-
tion was implemented. Otherwise, the common-pool re-
source situation remained. Groups who had experienced
private property in the second round of the experiment,
made diﬀerent decisions in the third round when open
access was reinstituted in contrast to groups who experi-
enced two roundsof openaccess.At the group level, earn-
ings increased in round 3, but thiswas at a cost ofmore in-
equality. No significant diﬀerences in outcomes occurred
between experiments where rules were imposed by the
experimental design or chosen by participants.
When we included face-to-face communication, we
observed informal arrangements to divide up space and
slow down the harvesting rate in various ways (Janssen
and Ostrom, 2008). We observed that experienced par-
ticipants, who had participated in an earlier experiment,
in the study above, where private property was used as
one way of controlling harvesting in this renewable re-
source environment, are more eﬀective in creating rules,
although theymimic the private-property regime of their
prior experience. Inexperienced participants need an ex-
tra round to reach the same level of resource use, but they
craft a diverse set of novel rule sets.
The third set of experiments is reported in Janssen
(2010). In this study, we used an updated version of the
experimental software using a square-shaped environ-
ment, like Figure 1, with four participants. We included
a first round where a resource could be harvested by
just one participant to confirm that participants avoid
overharvesting if they do not share the resource. We also
designed each round to last for four minutes. We com-
municated the length of the round to the participants to
avoid that rapid overharvesting is caused by the uncer-
tainty of the duration of a round.
After the individual round, four participants are ran-
domly matched, leading each and every time to a rapid
collapse of the resource. We continued the experiment
for three rounds inwhichwe allowed communication via
text messages, chat, for five minutes. We were interested
in the eﬀect of communication and the type of rules
they crafted. The earnings improved significantly with
the allowance of communication. Text analysis shows
that participants create informal institutions that define
when, where, and how to appropriate the resource and
this varies with the ecological dynamics in the diﬀerent
treatments. These treatments diﬀer by the regeneration
rate, and spatial heterogeneity vs. homogeneity of the
resource regeneration rate. The informal arrangements
focus on several possibilities: (1) dividing up the space
into four areas, (2) waiting or not to harvest at the start
of the round, and (3) how many seconds before the end
of the round can the rules be ignored so as to collect all
the remaining tokens.
By analyzing the content of all messages and coding
them into twenty diﬀerent categories, we find that the
amount and distribution of communication messages –
not the content of the communication – explain the dif-
ferences between group performances.
The first three studies showed that participants are
able to craft rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons.
We also gained suﬃcient experiencewith this new exper-
imental environment to be ready to use it to test the recent
findings in experimental economics that costly punish-
ment increases gross earnings. We include costly pun-
ishment by allowing participants to click on the number
of the avatar, which reduces their own earning by one
token and the other participant’s earning by two tokens.
We performed a number of experiments inwhichwe var-
ied whether we start with communication and/or costly
sanctioning for three rounds, or end with it (Tab. 1).
Our experiments show, however, that costly pun-
ishment is used but lacks a gross positive eﬀect on re-
source harvesting unless combined with communication
(Janssen et al., 2010). Figure 2 shows that costly punish-
ment does not lead to a significant change. Communi-
cation after three rounds without communication (and
costly punishment) increases the earnings, and thus per-
formance. However, if communication and costly pun-
ishment are allowed (and used), the earnings drop sig-
nificantly when communication and punishment are no
longer allowed.
Field experiments
We performed a series of experiments in six rural vil-
lages in Thailand and Colombia: three in Thailand and
three in Colombia. The villages were selected to repre-
sent a dominant resource use of one of the three re-
source appropriation activities: fishery, forestry, and ir-
rigation. In Thailand, experiments were performed in
the Petchaburi watershed, situated in western Thai-
land, in three separate locations: one in the coastal
area, and the other two in inland areas. The Colom-
bian experiments were conducted in three diﬀerent rural
sites. The fishery community is represented by a village
on Barú Island, a rural area of Cartagena city on the
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Table 1. Experimental design.
Name Number of groups Practice Periods 1–3 Periods 4–6
(individuals)
NCP-CP 6 (30) Individual
resource
Neither communication
nor punishment (NCP)
Communication plus
costly punishment (CP)
CP-NCP 6 (30) Individual
resource
Communication plus
costly punishment (CP)
Neither communication
nor punishment (NCP)
NCP-P 5 (25) Individual
resource
Neither communication
nor punishment (NCP)
Costly punishment (P)
P-NCP 6 (30) Individual
resource
Costly punishment (P) Neither communication
nor punishment (NCP)
NCP-C 5 (25) Individual
resource
Neither communication
nor punishment (NCP)
Communication (C)
C-NCP 5 (25) Individual
resource
Communication (C) Neither communication
nor punishment (NCP)
0
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600
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Fig. 2. Average net number of tokens collected by groups per period. The tokens lost due to punishment are subtracted from the
total tokens harvested. Six diﬀerent treatments are distinguished with combinations of no communication or costly punishment
(NCP), communication (C), costly punishment (P) or communication and costly punishment (CP) [based on Janssen et al. (2010,
p. 616)].
Caribbean Coast. The irrigation community is located
in the Fúquene Lake basin area, located in the Andean
region of Cundinamarca and Boyacá; the forestry com-
munity is located on the Pacific Coast tropical forest
area. The experiments have been replicated with college
students in Bogota and Bangkok.
In each village, each of the three resource games were
conducted with four groups of five people. As a re-
sult, 480 individuals participated in the experiments (see
Tab. 2). We performed three types of games in each vil-
lage: fishery, forestry, and irrigation. The basic structure
was that participants first experienced ten rounds of the
game, and then could vote for a rule change. The three
types of rules participants could choose from were lot-
tery (randomaccess to the resource), rotation (predefined
schedule forwhen to access the resource), and quota (lim-
ited allowable harvest). After the voting, the group con-
tinuedwith the rule they elected.All decisionsweremade
in private.
The goal of the experiments was to test how rele-
vant experience with resource management aﬀected the
decisions participants made and the rules participants
elected. We expected that, for example, a fishery game
would be played diﬀerently, more cooperatively, by fish-
ers than by foresters and farmers. After each experiment,
the players were asked to answer a set of questions on
the set of rules (How eﬃcient do you think this rule is
for managing the resource? How fair do you think this
rule is for managing the resource? How much personal
freedom do you think this rule allows you in managing
M.A. Janssen et al.: Natures Sciences Sociétés 19, 382-394 (2011) 387
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Table 2. Experimental design and sample.
Sample Fishery
village
Irrigation
village
Forestry
village
City Total
Fishery
game
20 Colombia
20 Thailand
20 Colombia
20 Thailand
20 Colombia
20 Thailand
20 Colombia
20 Thailand
160
Irrigation
game
20 Colombia
20 Thailand
20 Colombia
20 Thailand
20 Colombia
20 Thailand
20 Colombia
20 Thailand
160
Forestry
game
20 Colombia
20 Thailand
20 Colombia
20 Thailand
20 Colombia
20 Thailand
20 Colombia
20 Thailand
160
Total 120 people
24 sessions
120 people
24 sessions
120 people
24 sessions
120 people
24 sessions
480 people
96 sessions
Table 3. Maximum harvest allowed (forestry game).
Current resource level Individual maximum harvest level
25–100 5
20–24 4
15–19 3
10–14 2
5–9 1
0–4 0
the resource? How much do you think this rule would
advance your own self-interest as measured by your to-
tal earning? All things considered, how attractive do you
find this rule?). An individual survey was done with a
section on collective action and trust. At the end of the
series of experiments, a handful of peoplewere identified
for in-depth interviews.
Forestry game
The key feature of the forestry game is the renewable
component of the stockof timber. The stock is represented
as 100 magnets, trees, on a board. In each round, partic-
ipants can take a maximum of five magnets from the
board. The stock will regenerate. For every ten magnets
on the board, one magnet is added, with a maximum of
100 magnets. When the stock is below 25 trees, the max-
imum number of magnets each individual is allowed to
extract is indicated in Table 3. When participants collect
as much as possible as fast as possible, the stock will be
depleted in five rounds, and the tokens collected by the
group is 119. When they cooperate and maximize, the
group earning the group total can increase to 165 for a
sequence of ten periods or rounds.
The resources are rapidly overharvested in the first
ten rounds (Fig. 3). After participants have voted for
one of the rules (55% voted for rotation, the other two
rules split the rest of the votes), the decline of the re-
source slows down and participants harvest on average
20% more trees. However, due to the frequent rule vi-
olations the net earnings did not increase. If we look
at the individual-level behavior of the participants, we
see that when harvesting is not allowed, 70% break the
rule. When a rule is broken, a lower amount of trees
is harvested than normal. This leads to a reduction of
the harvesting pressure, but due to penalties being paid
when caught illegally appropriating trees, the net earn-
ings do not increase. More in-depth statistical analysis
reveals that participantswho feel less accepted as amem-
ber of the community are more likely to break the rules
(Janssen et al., in preparation). Furthermore, those who
have a higher level of trust in others in the community
are more likely to break the rule, probably because they
trust others will accept the rule breaking, as is usual in
these circumstances.We do not find that games played in
villages dominated by forestry make diﬀerent decisions
than other villages.
Water irrigation game
In the irrigation game, participants receive ten tokens
each round and must first decide how much to invest in
a public fund that generates water for the whole group
to share; then each player, in sequential turns from up-
stream to downstream players, decides how much to ex-
tract from the generated water. Each token kept (not in-
vested) has a monetary value for the player and is equal
to the value of each unit of water extracted.
Participants have positions A, B, C, D, or E, where
A has the first choice to harvest water from the common
infrastructure. This game includes the dilemma of up-
stream participants who need the help of downstream
participants to generate a favorable size of the common
infrastructure. However, the downstream participants
can only get benefits from the common infrastructure
when upstream participants avoid the temptation to de-
plete the common resource and leave water for players
downstream.
Under this asymmetric game, participants first expe-
rience a contribution dilemma and then face a resource
appropriation dilemma when they extract from the gen-
erated resource. In Table 4, thewater provision generated
is defined as a function of the total investments of the five
participants. Clearlyunder these incentives and rules, the
Nash equilibrium is that no one invests in the water pro-
vision, and all receive ten tokens for a group earnings of
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Fig. 3. Average resource size, number of trees, for the villages (v) and student groups (s) in Colombia and Thailand.
Table 4. Water production as a function of units invested in
public funds (water game).
Total units invested by all five players Water available
0–10 0
11–15 5
16–20 20
21–25 40
26–30 60
31–35 75
36–40 85
41–45 95
46–50 100
fifty tokens. In the cooperative (social optimum) solution,
everyone invests his/her ten tokens in the public good,
producing 100 units of income in each round. Therefore,
for a sequence of ten rounds, the group earnings would
sum 500 tokens and a social optimum could go up to
1 000 tokens.
Our experiments show that there is a dynamic inter-
action between equality in the use of the common re-
source and the level of the contributions to the creation
of a common resource (Janssen et al., submitted). The
initial levels of investments are explained by the level
of trust participants have in other people in the com-
munity. Higher levels of trust correlate with higher in-
vestments. The investment levels are reasonably stable
over the rounds, and systematically lower for students
compared to villagers (Fig. 4). We also observe a distri-
bution of investments into the public infrastructure that
is independent of the position of the participants. How-
ever, the level of collected water is unequally distributed
(Fig. 5). Participants upstreamderive a higher share com-
pared to participants downstream. Statistical analysis
shows that inequality in the distribution of benefits in
one round triggers lower levels of group contributions,
reducing eﬃciency and triggering even more inequality
in contributions and distribution of the resource among
players (Janssen et al., submitted).
Fishery game
In the fishery game, participants decide each round
where to fish and howmuch eﬀort to exert. There are two
locations, A andB, towhich they can choose to go. In each
location, they can choose to exert low or high levels of
eﬀort. There is a slightly higher return from a high eﬀort
compared to a low eﬀort (see Tab. 5). The payoﬀ table is
the same for both locations, and the initial state of the
resource is the high fish availability (Tab. 5). However,
when the total eﬀort in a location is five or more units,
the state of the fish stockwill move to the low availability.
This situation can only be reversed when not more than
one unit of eﬀort is invested in that location in two con-
secutive rounds. When participants behave opportunis-
tically, theymove to the low state of both resources in two
rounds, and get stuck in that situation for the remainder
of the rounds. For a sequence of ten rounds, this oppor-
tunistic behavior will result in 200 tokens for the five-
person group. However, if they coordinated their eﬀorts,
the cooperative solution leads to 382 tokens by spreading
the eﬀort equally over the two resources where at least
two people do not exert the maximum eﬀort.
Figure 6 shows the average earnings over the rounds
(Castillo et al., to appear). The earnings drop quickly due
to the state of the resource switch from high to low pay-
oﬀs. However, the states of the fishing grounds remain
low for most of the groups due to persistent high levels
of eﬀort. After rules are elected, the flip to the low payoﬀ
statewasdelayed, leading tohigher earnings. Thepattern
is the same for both countries. If we look at all the vil-
lages, we find that fishing villages do overharvest more
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Fig. 4. The average level of the generated public infrastructure for irrigation village groups, groups fromother villages, and student
groups.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
A B C D E
Position
C
on
tri
bu
tio
n
Contribution (rounds 1-10)
Contribution (rounds 11-20)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
A B C D E
Position
Ex
tra
ct
io
n
Collection (rounds 1-10)
Collection (rounds 11-20)
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Fig. 6. Average group earnings in the fishing villages of the sample.
Table 5.Returns (tokens) fromfishing eﬀort andfishavailability
in one location (fishery game).
Fish available in location Fishing eﬀort
0 1 2
High 0 7 8
Low 0 2 3
than other rural villages and significantly more than the
student groups.
Return visits
A year after the field experiments, we returned to the
villages to discuss the settings and the results of the ex-
periments. We then started to develop a role game of
the experiment that was most relevant for the village
(Castillo, in preparation). Through a self-construction
process, the objective was to assess the type of context
that needed to be added for relevant decision making.
Given a set of guiding questions, a group of villagers ad-
justed the experiment to make it more relevant to their
situation. Depending on the experiment, they included
more ecological complexity (species, spatial heterogene-
ity), diﬀerent types of actors (middlemen, industrial fish-
ers), and technology (gear). After a role game was de-
veloped, it was played with new participants from the
village.
Some general lessons can be drawn. For the forestry
role-games in both the Colombian and Thai cases, the
key driver is the system of economic transaction between
the woodcutters and the buyers. The demand for wood
drives theharvest eﬀort. For the irrigation role-games, the
villagers put the focus on water sharing but did not pay
attention to the water-provisioning issue. The problemof
provisioning is in fact a stake at a higher organizational
level where water is shared among big canals. Locally,
the farmers are less concerned. In Thailand, for exam-
ple, a small group of farmers (about ten) on a common
canal share the water according to the diﬀerent needs.
The sharing is collectively decidedwith the leadership of
one farmerwho takes the responsibility to visit the higher
organizational level when the total amount allocated to
the small canal is insuﬃcient. With regards to the fishing
villages, return visits have shown that the two ecolog-
ical contexts are very diﬀerent. The abundance of fish
is poor in Colombia and rich in Thailand. However, in
both cases, the fishermen played very competitive roles
leading to the “tragedy of the commons” pattern. The
rationale is: “what is not caught by me will be caught
by others”. From the role games, we can understand that
the fishermen brought their own “reality” in the field ex-
periment, leading to diﬃculties for coordination. It also
appears that (1) broader context aﬀects cooperation lev-
els at the local scale and (2) high levels of trust among
local fishermen are not suﬃcient for resource sustainabil-
ity when trust in external rule designers and enforcers is
low (Castillo et al., to appear).
Lessons learned
The expectation at the start of the project was that
specific experiencewith resourcemanagement would af-
fect the way participants play the game and the rules
they would develop. We expected that participants with
more relevant experience would achieve higher levels of
performance and choose rules that increased the perfor-
mance more than those groups who had less relevant ex-
perience. These expectations have beenpartly confirmed.
Participants in laboratory experiments who were invited
to participate a second time crafted eﬀective rules more
rapidly in line with previous experiences. In the field
experiments, we derived mixed results. In general, the
choice of rules did not improve the average earnings of
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the groups. It is interesting to note that students were
more eager to vote for property rights while villagers
preferred rotation and lottery types of rules. Although
participants could vote for the rules, the three options
were chosen by the experimenters andparticipantsmight
experience those options to be imposed on them. We de-
cided to have the same kind of rule choices for each game
and each village in order to compare the outcomes. These
rule choices might not have fit the local context in vari-
ous cases, as shown for instance during return visits to
irrigation villages.
We found that resource-specific experience led to
lower cooperation in the fishery game among fishers.
Since fishers in the communities where we performed
the experiments expected the other fishers to be highly
competitive (as shownearlier), theyoverharvested the re-
source more quickly than groups in other villages. When
the experimental settings match the reality of the play-
ers, like for the fishery, we see that they actually imported
their specific experience in the experiments. But this does
not mean that they performed better, as in reality they do
not perform well at preserving the resource and collec-
tively maximizing their income.
We found that contextual variables, such as trust in
other community members and the feeling of being an
accepted member of the community, had significant ex-
planatory power, more than experience. We included a
sophisticated survey, but inhindsight,we shouldhave in-
cluded more options to measure the contextual variables
of the social fabric of the community. Information about
power relationships and status of the participants of the
games might have been especially useful information.
Originally, we expected to have a tighter connection
between the field and the laboratory experiments. How-
ever, the development cycles of the field and laboratory
experiments are quite diﬀerent.We investedmore in soft-
ware development for the laboratory experiments and
started to focus more on communication since the use
of text chat provides insightful opportunities. Although
software development is slow, one can perform new ex-
periments every year. The development, pretesting, and
implementation of field experiments took years. Practical
limitations ledus tonotdomanyexperiments in one com-
munity nor to include novel treatments. The results of
the field experiments led tomany new questions, andwe
plan to perform a series of laboratory experiments with
the design of the field experiments in order to narrow
down research questions for future experiments in the
field. We found a consistency between lab experiments
and role-playing games:when villagers set a role-playing
game, they very often create an arena for communica-
tion but do not give any orientation on what will be the
content of communication (rules, roles). This is consis-
tent with the lab experiments, which revealed that the
amount of communication are more important than the
content of communications.
To conclude, our experiments, both the lab and the
field, have led to new insights and methodological inno-
vations. Social context seems to be more important than
resource-specific knowledge in explaining the behavior
in experiments. This confirms the recent focus on con-
ditional cooperation. Participants use information of the
social context to determine the types of participants in the
game, andbehave accordingly. This informationmight be
derived from communication or from knowledge about
other community members (in case the group members
in the experiment are known, as was the case in field
experiments).
Capturing context: a framework
of collective action
In recent years, there has been an increased interest
in field experiments and conducting experiments with
nontraditional subject pools, such as hunter-gatherers.
Henrich et al. (2010) focus on cultural diﬀerences and
market integration that explain diﬀerent levels of coop-
eration. Within the same culture, we also see diﬀerences
in the decisions that participants make in social dilemma
games (Gurven et al., 2008). We need to move beyond the
broad notions of “culture” and “context” and be more
precise in identifying specific attributes.
Poteete et al. (2010) present an alternative framework
of collective action and the commons based on field
studies and experiments, and stress the importance of
microsituational variables, the broader context, and the
relationship between them (Fig. 1). The conventional the-
ory was pristine in the simplicity of its model of human
behavior. All individuals were thought to be selfish and
rational. Individuals were assumed to have complete in-
formation about the structure of the situation they are in,
including the preferences of other actors, the full range
of possible actions, and the probability associated with
each outcome resulting from a combination of actions.
Decades of fieldwork and experiments emphasized
that not all humans behave like selfish rational beings,
and that participants do not complete information about
all situations of interest to theorists. Furthermore, alter-
native formal modeling approaches, such as agent-based
modeling, have shown that conditional cooperation can
be explained for a wide spectrum of conditions (Axelrod,
1984). The project that we described is an illustration of
the importance of using multiple methods that start to
unravel the complexity of collective action.
The alternative framework provided by Poteete et al.
(2010) is not complete, but it provides a starting point to
identify the important attributes of action situations that
need to be measured in empirical studies.
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Fig. 7. Conceptual framework of collective action where broader context and microsituational variables aﬀect the levels of trust
and cooperation [based on Poteete et al. (2010, p. 221)].
Instead of assuming selfish rational individualsmaxi-
mizing a particular type of payoﬀ functionwith complete
information, we need to base analyses on assumptions
about individuals who have imperfect knowledge, who
learn and adopt norms, and who are influenced by mi-
crosituational and broader contextual variables. Poteete
et al. (2010) believe that behavior is more directly influ-
enced by microsituational variables, which in turn are
influenced by the broader contextual variables (Fig. 7).
Examples of microsituational variables include group
size, heterogeneity among participants, reputation, and
time horizons. Examples of broader context are policies
at higher levels of organization, resource dynamics, his-
tory of social relationships, and geography. For a more
in-depth discussion of this alternative framework, we
refer to chapter 9 of Poteete et al. (2010). We will now
emphasize the application of the framework to our case
study.
The microsituational variables in our experiments
confirmed the high levels of cooperation we observed.
The group size is relatively small – four or five people.
The reputation of the other participants could be well es-
timated since the participants were fellow undergradu-
ate students, or known community members. They had
repeated interactions and could not change the group com-
position. When communication was possible, the level of
cooperation often increased.
In field experiments, communication was not possi-
ble, but was introduced during the role games in the
return visits. In some situations, communication did not
improve cooperation, as the level of trust between peo-
ple was too low. Information about the actions of others
is extensive and accurate but limited to the group level
in the field experiments. During the role-playing games,
the players often set the information system to be aware
of others’ actions or others’ demands. Costly punishment
was an option in lab experiments, while sanctions were
executed by the experimenter in the field experiment.
In the role-playing games, the villagers did not keep
the punishment options. Amicrosituational variable that
may limit the level of cooperation iswhen the time horizon
is known to be limited.
During the returnvisits, the broader contextwasmore
important. The lack of trust between the fishermen and
the agencies in charge of resourcemanagement in the two
fishery villages was very clear, explaining partly how re-
luctant the fishermen are to adopt rules. The other ex-
planation lies in the lack of leadership or conflict among
subgroups of fishermen. In the case of forestry villages,
we have seen that both Thai and Colombian harvests
are driven by the demand for forest products. For the
irrigation village, the very conflictual situation between
farmers and governmental bodies in Colombia is the key
issue. In Thailand, the quality of the social relationships
among farmers leads to a collective sharing of the water.
Ostrom (2007) introduced a diagnostic approach to
study social-ecological systems. She acknowledged the
many variables that can influence the level of collective
action. Instead of measuring all possible variables, we
need to define a multilayered system of indicators that
match the social-ecological systemof interest. In any case,
this means that we need to measure contextual variables
more systematically than is often done. Especially with
regard to experiments, we need to derive more relevant
information to interpret the actions in the experiments
(Bouma et al., 2008; Anderies et al., to appear). In this
project, we introduced the role-playing games, which al-
low the introduction of more context in the experiments.
As the role-playing games are crafted by the stakehold-
ers, after being in the experiments, researchers obtained
better information about the relevant variable in a situa-
tion from the stakeholders’ perspective.
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Discussion
This project combines diﬀerent methods to test a
framework for collective action applied to renewable re-
source management. Both methods are based on “learn-
ing from action situations”. Experiments in the lab, ex-
periments in the field, and role-playing games put people
in action situations. These methods diﬀer by the level of
control on the actors and the level of context they em-
bed. While some propose very simple settings allowing
generic conclusions, others include more context, allow-
ing a better understanding of the decision-making pro-
cess of the players (individual and collective). We pro-
pose here an articulation of the methods.
With lab experiments, we provided a renewable re-
source to the players, looked at the type of rules that
players craft, and tested the role of sanctioning and com-
munication. The field experiments were more contextu-
alized. We measured the eﬀect of rules in both settings.
We associated the field experimentswith self-constructed
role-playing games to assess what type of context the
players would add to make the experiments closer to
reality. While doing so, we could assess how close to re-
ality the earlier experiments were, and thus have a better
understanding of the actions of the players during the
experiments. For instance, during the field experiments,
contrary to our hypothesis, we observed that the fish-
ermen were worse than other types of stakeholders at
playing the fishery experiments. We had thought that
experienced people would be better at optimizing the re-
sults on a game similar to their reality. The role-playing
game revealed that in the field, the fishermen are actu-
ally very individualistic, lacking trust in others’ ability
to respect any rule. Fishermen bring their experience to
the experiments, but this does not mean that they will
perform better. With the combination of methods, we
find that microsituational variables and broader context
are both important in explaining observed behavior in
experiments.
Given the importance of context, we need to perform
experiments with communities in diﬀerent contexts, in-
cluding undergraduate students inWestern societies and
small-scale societies that have limited interaction with
modern economies. This will require collective action
among scholars who study collective action. We need
to build up (cyber) infrastructure to collect and compare
case studies and experiments to advance ourunderstand-
ing of governing the commons.
Another conclusion from using these diﬀerent meth-
ods is the fact that the quality of resource manage-
ment lies more on the possibility of communication
rather than on the types of rules crafted. Lab exper-
iments have shown that the amount and distribution
of communication are more important than the content
of the interactions. The field experiments did not allow
communication and crafting of rules. In general, we did
not find an influence of the type of rule selected. In the
role-playinggames,weobserved that inmost cases stake-
holders included negotiation arenas as part of the game
environment, but did not specify the management rules.
Again, like in the lab experiments, the organization of
communication is more important than the content of
communication. In closing, the various researchactivities
stress the importance of social capital and trusting rela-
tionships in communities. Experience and knowledge of
resource governance might be important, but not as im-
portant as the trust relationships in small communities.
Whether this finding scales up to governance of social-
ecological systems are larger scales is an open question.
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